DCI TALKING POINTS SIG-I MEETING, 17 DECEMBER 1985

I have called you together today so that we may best continue in our ongoing task of integrating policy guidance across the entire counterintelligence and countermeasure spectrum. We will be reviewing key developments to thereby assist us.

The counterintelligence and security committees have been particularly active during the past year in identifying and addressing many specific problem issues. This has been and is being accomplished by single discipline and multi discipline committees and councils such as DCI committees and the National Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Committee, as well as by the SIG-I system and its Interagency Groups for Counterintelligence and Countermeasures.

The totality of this ongoing effort is what enables the SIG-I to carry out its unique responsibility as the integrator of policy guidance across the entire counterintelligence and countermeasure spectrum. This is why it is at the top of the CI and CM policymaking pyramid and why only the SIG structure has total CI and CM policymaking cognizance.

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As Chairman of the SIG-I, I continue to welcome the challenge thereby afforded to bolster our national security. In view of the multiplicity and complexity of the many and diverse efforts under way for improved counterintelligence and countermeasure capabilities and to assist our ongoing integration of CI and CM policy guidance, it is appropriate that we have a review of what is happening.

To further facilitate our involvement in CI and CM issues, I want the SIG structure, particularly its two IGs, to meet more often. We must continue to take the initiative for pulse-taking--for examining and taking remedial or bolstering actions with respect to the scope, adequacy, and direction of the activities of Community committees and councils. This includes both NSC and DCI level committees. All their output does not need to follow through the SIG structure, but they must continue to be subject to whatever reviews or examinations we deem appropriate.

I am also considering the preparation of a new SIG-I directive to help give added emphasis and strength to our ongoing policy integrating efforts, especially in the security field. We can also thereby reflect changes in Community structure, programs, and activities. For example, the Chairman of the IG/CM should be a designated member of the SIG-I whenever it meets on IG/CM matters. This is not now the case.

With respect to the impending Congressionally required Counterintelligence Capabilities Improvements Report, I will have to wait for receipt of the SSCI report on what it believes needs to be done in CI and CM before deciding how the SIG-I system can best respond.

We expect that the SSCI will propose a national strategic security program. The SSCI's idea is that, at the national level, there should be some element that would, from an overall policy and implementation responsibility, integrate and combine the various committees and groups responsible for security, such as SECOM, Information Handling, NTISSC, and the IG/CM.

I think, however, as my comments clearly indicate, that we already have such a comprehensive policymaking structure, that it is working, and that only some such fine tuning as I have cited may be necessary.

The SIG-I system supplements but does not replace other executive branch policy recommending and implementing entities such as the DCI Security Committee, the NTISSC and the SIG for Technology Transfer. It does, however, have the capability for and mission of ensuring proper national-level coordination of all counterintelligence and countermeasure matters. Many national-level policy and legal issues are or should be developed or reviewed by the IGs and referred to the SIG-I with appropriate recommendations. The SIG-I, in turn, endorses

courses of action or refers issues to the NSC for implementation decisions.

In my mind, there is no question that the SIG-I structure not only has the right but the duty to monitor, review, and provide integrating policy guidance across the entire counterintelligence and countermeasure spectrum.

So much for the larger picture. What I propose to do now in furtherance of my objectives for this meeting is to touch briefly and summarily on some of the key counterintelligence and countermeasure/security developments which have occurred during the past year or so. Then I would like representatives of pertinent Intelligence Community committees to assist by further briefing us appropriately.

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